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Abstract
We consider variable preference relations, called also reference depen-
dent preference relations which are typical in the study of dynamic models
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generalization of acyclicity, as an immediate regret condition for variable
preferences. The main result to establish is on an existence criterion for
maximal elements of a space equipped with a weak consistent variable
preference relation. It is expressed via preference completeness condition
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obtained from the unifying approach of this paper.
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1 Introduction
Preference is one of the fundamental concepts in economics and social sciences.
It refers to a way to put available alternatives in a certain order according to
their degree of utility or satisfaction and aims at answering the question ”stay
or move?”. In equilibrium theory a static point of view is dominant, that is, one
is looking for situations in which all agents prefer to stay rather then to move;
while in innovation theory (Schumpeter 1943 [22]) a dynamic point of view is
more important, that is, one is interested in knowing when the agents prefer
moving from their current situations than staying there. These points of views
are dual, once a preference is given. In the classical models preference relations
are a priori determined and constant. They are transitive, and sometimes com-
plete, often defined by utility functions, which greatly facilitate applications of
mathematical tools. However, in the real world preference relations vary with
the context (experience, characters, emotions, mental state, social links, em-
beddedness...) and have evolutionary nature, generating dynamic processes of
actions. This is why models with changing preferences appeal much attention
of researchers for several decades (see Basmann 1956 [4], Bleichbrodt 2007[5],
Koszegi and Rabin 2006 [16], Tversky and Kahneman 1991 [27] among many
others).
In the present study we consider preference relations, not necessarily being
transitive or complete, or given by utility functions, but varying from state to
state. Our overall concern is the question under which circumstances maximal
elements exist for a variable preference relation without transitivity. Maximal el-
ements play a central role in many economic models, including global maximum
of a utility function and Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game or equilib-
rium of generalized game (Debreu 1959 [9]). Existence of maximal elements has
been extensively studied for constant preference relations and literature on it is
abundant. However, to our knowledge there exists few papers dealing with exis-
tence of maximal elements in the case of variable preference relations. Koszegi
2010 [15], Koszegi-Rabin 2006 [16] and some others study a personal equilibrium
of consumption in which a particular variable preference is used via variable util-
ity functions (see also Gul-Pesendorfer, 2006 [13]); Soubeyran 2009 [23] considers
a worthwhile to change function, which generates a variable preference relation
to model a number of problems of social science such as habits, routines, behav-
ioral traps etc. in terms of maximal elements. To establish existence criteria
for maximal elements of a variable preference relation we exploit the concept of
order-completeness borrowed from vector optimization which can be interpreted
as a hypothesis on aspiration points recently introduced in the theory of change
(see Soubeyran 2009 [23]) or Brezis-Browder’s inductivity hypothesis (Brezis
and Browder 1976 [8]) when the preference relation is determined by a utility
function. Similar to the case of multi-criteria optimization given in Luc [18] and
recently in Flores-Bazan et al. [11] the method of order-complete sets is very
useful in unifying results on existence of maximal elements in various contexts,
including (a) existence of maximal elements in social choice theory with non-
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transitive and incomplete preferences (Bergstrom 1975 [6] for acyclic relations,
Tian and Zhou 1993 [25] for transfer upper continuous preferences, Zuanon 2009
[32] for weakly tc-upper semicontinuous acyclic relations, Alcantud 2002 [1] for
upper continuous preference on ” Â ”-upper compact sets, Andrikopoulos and
Zacharias 2009 [3] for consistent upper tc-S- semicontinuous preferences); (b)
maximum ordering principles in partially ordered spaces without compactness
(Altman 1982 [2], Turinici 1984 [28], Szaz 2007 [24], Zeidler 1986 [30], Zhu and
Li 2007 [31] in the context of partial ordering); and (c) efficiency conditions
in the framework of generalized multi-criteria optimization (Flores-Bazan et al.
2008 [11]).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 basic concepts and ele-
mentary properties of variable preference relations are given. We introduce the
concept of weak consistency which generalizes well-known concepts of acyclic-
ity, path consistency and consistency by Suzumura. We establish equivalence
between acyclicity of a variable preference relation and its transitive closure
being a partial order. Section 3 deals with a central concept of our paper: ex-
ante maximal points and their existence. We prove a criterion for existence of
maximal elements in a space equipped with a variable preference relation. It
is based on the idea of order-complete sets from vector optimization and the
weak consistency introduced in Section 2. Section 4 is devoted to applications
of the main existence result of Section 3 to several models of recent literature.
Related notions such as ex-ante ideal elements, ex-post ideal elements and ex-
post maximal elements are also briefly discussed. Applications of our approach
to behavioral traps and equilibrium theory will be addressed in a forthcoming
work.
2 Basic concepts and elementary properties
Let X be a set of actions or choices of an agent or a group of agents, or a set of
states of an economic system. A preference relation onX that evolves from state
to state is called a variable preference relation. Reference dependent, variable,
dynamic and evolutionary preferences have the same meaning in our context.
They all describe a system in which at a given state x ∈ X an agent has a set of
criteria that forms a preference relation allowing him to choose a new state to
move to. At this new state, again, he has a set of criteria that may differ from the
one he has had at x and generates a new preference relation for the next move.
Examples of variable preference relations are found in multicriteria decision
making, consumption theory, psychology and other areas of social sciences (see
Giraud 2004 [12]), Kahneman and Tversky 1979 [14], Lindblom 1959 [17] and
references given therein).
In this section we develop fundamental concepts related to variable prefer-
ence relations and some of their elementary properties. Let us first recall basic
definitions for constant preference relations. A preference relation P on X is
a relation linking pairs of elements of X, that is, P is a binary relation on X
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and defined by a subset R of the product space X ×X as follows: for x, y ∈ X,
one has xPy (we say y is preferred to x) if and only if (x, y) ∈ R. A preference
relation P is said to be reflexive if xPx for all x ∈ X; it is irreflexive if xPx is
true for no x ∈ X; it is antisymmetric if xPy and yPx implies x = y; and it is
transitive if xPy and yPz imply xPz. A reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive
preference relation is called a partial order. Sometimes irreflexive partial orders
are also considered. Reflexivity of a preference relation occurs in a system when
an agent is happy with his position, that is, according to his criteria, the current
position is acceptable for his next move. Irreflexivity occurs when an agent is
unhappy with his position and definitely wishes to move to another position at
the next step. If a preference relation P is not reflexive, mathematically one
may generate an associated reflexive preference relation by adding the diago-
nal of the space X × X to the set R. Similarly, if a preference relation is not
irreflexive, by deleting the diagonal from the set R one obtains an irreflexive
preference relation. In general, assuming a preference relation reflexive is widely
accepted by researchers and practitioners. Moreover, if P is reflexive, a strict
preference relation associated to P is defined to be an irreflexive preference re-
lation P ′ smaller than P in the sense that xP ′y implies xPy (or equivalently
the set R′ defining P ′ is a subset of R). When a reflexive preference relation P
is transitive, one defines equivalent classes on X as follows: x′ ∈ [x] if and only
if xPx′ and x′Px. The preference relation induced by P on equivalent classes
is denoted P¯ and defined by
[x]P¯ [y] if and only if x′Py′ for some x′ ∈ [x], y′ ∈ [y].
Then it is clear that P¯ is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive on the set [X]
of all equivalent classes of X. For a reflexive preference relation P on X, we
distinguish two kinds of strict preference relations associated with P :
xP ′y if and only if xPy and not yPx; (1)
xP ′′y if and only if xPy and x 6= y. (2)
Here is a link between these strict preference relations.
Lemma 1 If P is a reflexive preference relation on X, then
xP ′y implies xP ′′y.
Conversely, if P is transitive, then for the induced preference relation P¯ on the
equivalent classes on X one has
[x]P¯ ′′[y] implies [x]P¯ ′[y].
Consequently the two strict preference relations associated with P coincide.
Proof. The first part of the lemma is clear. For the second assertion, assume
that [x]P¯ ′′[y]. If (1) failed for the induced preference relation, we would have
xPy and yPx implying [x] = [y], which shows that (2) does not hold for P .
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Throughout this section we will assume that the space X is equipped with a
variable preference relation {” ≤x ” : x ∈ X} and that ” ≤x ” is reflexive. Given
an element x ∈ X, the following sets are of particular interest at the individual
or collective levels, ex-ante (before moving) and ex-post ( after moving) levels :
i) The ”ex-ante” dominant and dominated sets at x,
S+(x) = {y ∈ X : x ≤x y}
S−(x) = {y ∈ X : y ≤x x}.
Thus, S+(x) can be viewed as the set of states that dominates x by the criteria
at x, that is, states to which from his own point of view, being at the state x,
an agent or a group of agents wish to move; while S−(x) contains all states that
are dominated by x, that is, states to which, being at x and according to their
own judgements, an agent or a group of agents do not want to move.
ii) The ”ex-post” dominant and dominated sets at x,
F+(x) = {y ∈ X : x ≤y y}
F−(x) = {y ∈ X : y ≤y x}.
The terminology ”ex-post” refers to the fact that, starting from x and moving
to y, an agent or a group of agents prefer staying at y ∈ F+(x) to coming back
to x, this being judged by criteria at y after having moved from x.
From now on we shall fix the strict preference relation ” <x ” associated to
” ≤x ” by relation (1), that is x <x y if and only if x ≤x y and y 6≤y x (the
negation of y ≤y x). The ex-ante strict dominant and dominated sets at x are
defined in a similar manner with strict preference relation ” <x ” instead of
” ≤x ” and denoted respectively S>(x) and S<(x):
S>(x) = {y ∈ X : x <x y}
S<(x) = {y ∈ X : y <x x}.
Likewise, the sets of ex-post strict dominant and dominated sets at x are denoted
F>(x) and F<(x). An evident relationship between elements of the above sets
is the following:
y ∈ S+(x) (resp. y ∈ S>(x)) if and only if x ∈ F−(y) (resp. x ∈ F<(y));(3)
y ∈ S−(x) (resp. y ∈ S<(x)) if and only if x ∈ F+(y) (resp. x ∈ F>(y)).
In general, when the variable preference relation is not constant, the ex-ante
and ex-post dominant/ dominated sets are distinct. Let us now define paths
of acceptable changes or improving paths. Given two states x and y of X, an
upward path from x to y is a finite sequence of elements x1, ..., xn ∈ X such
that
x = x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = y. (4)
An upward path from x to y means that an agent, being at the state xk, prefers
to move to xk+1 along this path. A downward path from x to y is a sequence
of elements x1, ..., xn ∈ X such that
x = x1 ≤x2 x2 ≤x3 x3... ≤xn−1 xn−1 ≤xn xn = y.
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This means that once arrived at the state xk an agent prefers staying at this
state to coming back to the previous state xk−1. When n = 2 the above paths
are called direct; otherwise they are called indirect (because y is preferred to x
not directly, but through intermediate states xi for 1 < i < n).
Since variable preference relations are generally not transitive, upward paths
and downward paths provide a way to obtain transitive preference relations on
X. Let us define the upper transitive closure and the lower transitive closure of
the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” as follows:
• x ≤u y if and only if there is an upward path from x to y;
• x ≤` y if and only if there is a downward path from x to y.
Upper and lower transitive closures being transitive preference relations,
we may define equivalent classes on X. The induced preference relations are
denoted respectively ” ¹u ” and ” ¹` ”. In view of Lemma 1 there is no
distinction between strict preference relations by (1) and (2), so we denote them
by ” ≺u ” and ” ≺` ”. Below is a relationship between a variable preference
relation and its transitive closure.
Proposition 2 Assume that x ≤u y is given by (4). Then
y 6≤u x implies xk+1 6≤xk+1 xk for some k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
y 6= x implies xk+1 6= xk for some k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
Moreover, if [xk+1] 6¹u [xk] for some k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, then [y] 6¹u [x].
Proof. The first relation follows from the fact that if xk+1 ≤xk+1 xk for all
k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, then y ≤u x which contradicts the hypothesis. The second
relation is evident. For the last assertion, suppose to the contrary that [y] ¹u [x].
There is an upward path from y to x. Then the upward path
xk+1 ≤xk+1 xk+2... ≤xn y ≤u x = x1 ≤x1 x1... ≤xk−1 xk
yields xk+1 ≤u xk, implying [xk+1] = [xk]. This contradiction completes the
proof.
Related to paths of acceptable changes we present some basic concepts which
are already known for constant preference relations. The concept of weak con-
sistency seems to be new and generalizes acyclicity.
Transitivity. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to be transitive if
x ≤u y implies x ≤x y for all x, y ∈ X. In other words if two states are joint by
an indirect path, then they can be joint by a direct path.
Antisymmetry. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to be antisym-
metric if x ≤x y and y ≤y x imply x = y. We notice that given x0 ∈ X, as an
individual preference relation on X, (≤x0) need not be transitive or antisym-
metric even if the variable preference relation is such.
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Acyclicity. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to be acyclic if
for every upward path from x to itself, all intermediate elements coincide with
x. Equivalently, if there are finite numbers of elements x1, ..., xn ∈ X such
that an agent moves from x = x1 to xn through x2, ..., xn−1 and at least one
intermediate state xk is different from x, then x 6= xn.
Path consistency. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to be path
consistent if for every x ∈ X there is no upward path from x to itself x = x1 ≤x1
x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x in which at least one intermediate
preference is strict in the sense of (1), that is xk+1 6≤xk+1 xk for some k ∈
{1, ..., n− 1}. We see that acyclicity implies path consistency, but the converse
is not true in general. Actually, acyclicity can be seen as path consistency when
(2) is used instead of (1): there is no path from x to itself, say
x = x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x
such that at least one intermediate preference is strict in the sense that xk 6=
xk+1 for some k.
Suzumura’s consistency. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to
be consistent in Suzumura’s sense if whenever there is an upward path from x
to y 6= x, either there is a direct path from x to y, or no direct path from y
to x. In other words, for every x, y ∈ X,x 6= y and x1, ..., xn ∈ X such that
x = x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = y (the agent wants to pass
indirectly from x to y), then either x ≤x y (the agent wants to pass directly
from x to y) or y 6≤y x (the agent does not want to pass directly from y to x).
This definition is an adaptation of consistency by Bossert and Suzumura 2007
[7] for usual preference relations.
Weak consistency. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is said to be
weak consistent if whenever there is a direct path from x to y and an indirect
path from y to x, there is a direct path from y to x. In other words,
x ≤x y ≤y x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x implies y ≤y x.
This condition can be interpreted as an immediate ”regret” of having moved
from x to y after a long (indirect) way from y to x. Here is a relationship
between the notions of consistency given above.
Proposition 3 Every path consistent preference relation is Suzumura consis-
tent, and every Suzumura consistent preference relation is weak consistent.
Proof. Assume that x = x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = y. If
y ≤y x, then we have an upward path x1, ..., xn ∈ X such that x = x1 ≤x1
x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = y ≤y x. If the variable preference
relation is path consistent, then all intermediate relations are not strict in the
sense of (1), that is, xk+1 ≤xk+1 xk for k = 1, ..., n − 1 and x ≤x y. By this,
the preference relation is Suzumura consistent. Now, let x ≤x y ≤y= x1 ≤x1
x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2 xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x be an upward path from x to itself.
If the variable preference relation is Suzumura consistent, then one must have
y ≤y x, because x 6≤x y is not true.
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It can be seen without difficulty that the converse of Proposition 3 is not
true. The utility of acyclicity and consistency is seen from the next result, see
also Proposition 6.
Proposition 4 Given a variable preference relation ” ≤x ” on X, the induced
preference relation ” ¹u ” is a partial order on equivalent classes of X. More-
over, the transitive closure ” ≤u ” is a partial order on X if and only if the
variable preference relation is acyclic.
Proof. We first observe that being reflexive and transitive the transitive clo-
sure ” ≤u ” defines equivalent classes on X. And the induced preference relation
” ¹u ” is antisymmetric on equivalent classes, hence it is a partial order. Now
assume that ” ≤u ” is a partial order on X. Let x = x1 ≤x1 x2 ≤x2 x3..... ≤xn−2
xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x be an upward path from x to itself. Then for k = 2, ..., n−1
one has x ≤u xk and xk ≤u x. By antisymmetry x = xk. Hence the vari-
able preference relation is acyclic. Conversely, assume the preference relation
is acyclic. Then x ≤u y and y ≤u x imply x ≤u y ≤u x. Consequently, y is
an intermediate element of an upward path from x to itself. By acyclicity, all
intermediate elements of that path coincide with x, in particular y = x. The
proof is complete.
In a recent work by Andrikopoulos and Zacharias 2009 [3] the authors have
found some sufficient conditions under which a constant preference relation P is
acyclic (respectively Suzumura’s consistent) if and only if there there exist two
functions G : X → [0, 1] and C : X ×X → [0, 1] such that for every x, y ∈ X,
xPy ⇐⇒ G(y)−G(x) > C(x, y) (respectively either G(y)−G(x) > C(x, y) or
G(y) = G(x).)
3 Ex-ante maximal points
As we have already seen in the previous sections, variable preference relations
describe economies in movement. A move from a state x to a state y can be
targeted or not. In a move without target the agent has no goal to orient his
action, he just wishes to improve his situation as in muddling through process.
By changing from x ∈ X to y ∈ X, he passes from an ex-ante perception to an
ex-post perception. In an ex-ante perception the agent starts from doing x and
chooses to carry out a new action y, driven by an ex-ante motivation to change:
x ≤x y. From his initial point of view at x, he prefers moving to y than staying
at x. In an ex-post perception, once arrived at y (having done the new action y
), the agent compares, from his new point of view at y, his new situation y with
the old one x. Either he does not regret, from his new point of view at y, to be
at y because x ≤y y, or he regrets his move because y ≤y x. Given x ∈ X, the
ex-ante dominant set S+(x) is exactly the ex-ante preference change set at x.
It contains all possible improving moves from x according to the point of view
at x. In a targeted move, a state x being given, the agent starts from a state
y with y ≤y x. He sets x as his target to move to. The ex-post dominated set
F−(x) at x contains all states y at which the agent does not want to stay and
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from which he wishes to move to the target x. Then an important question is
to know whether a state exists such that once arrived there, the agent stops his
move, finding no better place to go. This is the concept of maximal points that
we are going to develop now.
Throughout this section the space X is equipped with a reflexive variable
preference relation ” ≤x ”. Below we define maximal points with respect to
the variable preference relation, and give some characterizations via dominant
and dominated sets. Then we introduce the concept of preference-complete
sets borrowed from vector optimization (Luc 1989 [19], see also Application 2,
Section 4) and prove a general criterion for existence of maximal points. A
particular variant of this criterion is proposed when the space is equipped with
a topology which turns to be quite useful in applications.
Definition 5 An element x∗ is said to be an ex-ante maximal point of X if
there is no y ∈ X such that the direct path from x∗ to y is possible, but the
direct path from y to x∗ is impossible. It is said to be an ex-ante strict maximal
point or a rest point of X if there is no point y 6= x∗ such that the direct path
from x∗ to y is possible, that is, x∗ ≤x∗ y.
As we have already discussed the terminology ”ex-ante” comes from the fact
that an agent or a group of agents starts from x∗ and considers, before moving,
the opportunity to move from x∗ to some y. It is clear that every rest point
(cycle of order zero) is an ex-ante maximal element (cycle of order zero and
one). The converse is generally not true except for the case of antisymmetric
preference relations. The definition above is applied to any binary relation on
X. Let P be a reflexive and transitive preference relation on X, we say that
x∗ is P -maximal point of X if there is no y ∈ X such that xPy and not yPx;
and it is a P -rest point if there is no y ∈ X such that xPy and x 6= y. In other
words, x∗ is a P-maximal point if there is no y ∈ X such that x∗P ′y, and it is
a P-rest point if there is no y ∈ X such that x∗P ′′y in the sense of (1) and (2)
respectively. Again we notice that when P is antisymmetric, these two notions
coincide (see Duggan 2007 [10]).
Proposition 6 Let x∗ be given. The following assertions hold.
1) There is equivalence between:
(a) x∗ is an ex-ante maximal element;
(b) S>(x∗) = ∅;
(c) x∗ 6∈ ∪y∈XF<(y).
2) There is equivalence between:
(d) x∗ is a rest point;
(e) S+(x∗) = {x∗};
(f) x∗ 6∈ ∪y∈X,y 6=x∗F−(y).
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3) If x∗ is ≤u-rest point, then it is a rest point.
4) If the variable preference is weak consistent and if an equivalent class [x∗]
is ¹u-maximal on [X], then x∗ (and any element of this class) is ex-ante
maximal on X.
Proof. Equivalence between (a) and (b) follows from the definition. Equiva-
lence between (b) and (c) follows from the relation (3). The proof of the second
assertion uses the same argument. For the third assertion we assume that x∗
is a ≤u-rest point. If for some y ∈ X one has x∗ ≤x∗ y, then x∗ ≤u y. By the
hypothesis x∗ = y. Hence x∗ is a rest point of X. To prove the last assertion,
assume that the class [x∗] is ¹u-maximal. Suppose that x∗ ≤x∗ y for some
y ∈ X. Then [x∗] ¹u [y]. By ¹u-maximality, we have [y] ¹u [x∗], which implies
y ≤u x∗. Hence there is an upward path from y to x∗:
y = x1 ≤x1 x2...xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x∗.
Completing this path by adding x∗ ≤x∗ y to the first term of the path we obtain
an upward path from x∗ to itself:
x∗ ≤x∗ y = x1 ≤x1 x2...xn−1 ≤xn−1 xn = x∗.
In view of weak consistency we deduce y ≤y x∗. This proves that x∗ is an
ex-ante maximal element of X.
Maximal elements include the case of personal habits, organizational rou-
tines, behavioral traps, personal equilibrium ( Koszegi and Rabin 2006 [16]),
Nash equilibrium, generalized Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stable equilibrium
(Thomas 1985 [26]), norms, conventions (Young 1993 [29]), innovation frontier,
Pareto solutions, bargaining solutions, focal points (Schelling 1960 [21]), ideal
points, cycling points (Duggan 2007 [10]), recurrent points or recurrent sets,
drops, top cycle set, untrapped set etc.
Existence of maximal elements without topology. We recall some stan-
dard definitions related to monotone nets. A net {yα}α∈I , where I is a directed
index set, is said to be (upper) strictly increasing if yα <u yβ whenever α < β.
It is said to be dominated by a net {xβ}β∈I′ if I ⊆ I ′ and for every α ∈ I there
is some β ∈ I ′ such that yα ≤u xβ . Given a point a ∈ X, the upper section of
X at a is denoted by S(a) := {x ∈ X : a ≤u x}.
Definition 7 A subset of X is said to be preference-complete (or P-complete
for short) if it has no covering of the type {X \ S(xα) : α ∈ I} with {xα}α a
strictly increasing net in that subset.
Notice that in the above definition no topological structure is necessary on
the space X. However, in most applications X is topological and we shall
explicitly assume it when necessary. Sufficient conditions for P-completeness
will be given later when we consider specific models (see Corollaries 10-15). For
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the moment let us present the main existence result of this section. There are
several ways to prove it under acceptance of Zorn’s lemma (see also Flores-
Bazan et al. 2008 [11] for constant preferences). The approach below is much
inspired by the one of Luc 1989 [18] for efficient points in vector optimization
and based on Proposition 6.
Theorem 8 Assume that the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” on X is weakly
consistent. Then X has ex-ante maximal points if and only if there is some point
a ∈ X such that the upper section of X at a is P-complete.
The proof of this theorem as well as its applications (Section 4) are given
in Appendix. We underline that the merit of the above theorem resides in the
sufficient part: if X admits a P-complete section, then it has maximal element.
It is to note that when X has maximal elements, it may have sections that
are not P-complete. As we’ll see later the concept of P-completeness is quite
convenient in deriving different kinds of existing conditions for maximal elements
when the preference relation is constant. Let us interpret P-completeness in
terms of aspiration states. Given a strictly increasing net {xα, α ∈ I} in X,
the family {X \ S(xα) : α ∈ I} is a covering of X if and only if for each
x ∈ X there is some index α ∈ I such that x 6∈ S(xα). Consequently, P-
completeness of X is equivalent to the fact that for each strictly increasing
net as above, there is a point x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈ S(xα) for all α ∈ I.
This point x∗ can be considered as an ”aspiration state” of the net. When
I is the set of the natural numbers N, a sequence {xn : n = 1, 2, ...} with
xn ≤xn xn+1 is called an improving process. If x∗ is an aspiration state of the
improving process {xn : n = 1, 2, ...}, then it belongs to the ex-ante dominant set
S+(xn) for all n ≥ 1. Hence along the improving process if the agent discovers
an aspiration state, he moves directly to it without passing through the whole
process, economizing time, money and energy. If in addition the aspiration state
x∗ is ex-ante strict maximal, then it is called an aspiration driven equilibrium
of the improving process. Thus, an aspiration driven equilibrium of the process
{xn : n = 1, 2, ...} satisfies two conditions: a) x∗ ∈ S+(xn) for all n ≥ 1, and
b) S+(x∗) = {x∗}. In the framework of partially ordered spaces the hypothesis
of existence of aspiration points has already been given by Brezis and Browder
under the name of inductivity hypothesis in their famous principle in Brezis and
Browder 1976 [8]. In fact, suppose that X is equipped with a partial order (≤).
The inductivity hypothesis is satisfied if a) every improving sequence {xn}n≥1
with xn ≤ xn+1 has an upper bound, and b) there exists a potential function Φ :
X → R which is bounded above and increasing, i.e. Φ = sup {Φ(x), x ∈ X} <
+∞ and x ≤ y =⇒ Φ(y) ≥ Φ(x). It is clear that for every x ∈ X, there exists
x∗ ∈ X such that x ≤ x∗ and Φ(y) = Φ(x∗) for all y such that x∗ ≤ y.Moreover,
if in addition x ≤ y and x 6= y imply Φ(x) < Φ(y), then S+(x∗) = {x∗}, which
means that x∗ is an aspiration driven equilibrium. The value Φ(x∗) is called
an improving goal payoff.
Before presenting a variant of Theorem 8 under the presence of a topology
on X, we stress once more the fact that Theorem 8 is valid for reflexive variable
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preferences which are not necessarily transitive, or antisymmetric. This is an
important point because it allows to study a lot of anomalies raised by Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979 in [14] and their followers (we’ll address this issue and
applications of variable preferences in another study).
Existence of maximal elements with topology. Throughout this part we
assume that X is a topological space. The concepts of upper closedness and
upper compactness to introduce below are essential for the study of variable
preferences in topological spaces.
Definition 9 The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” on X is said to be upper
closed if for every convergent strictly increasing net {yα}α∈I with limit y, either
S>(y) is empty, or there is some z ∈ X such that yα <u z for all α ∈ I. The
set X is said to be upper compact if every upper strictly increasing net in X is
dominated by a strictly increasing net that has a convergent subnet.
Compact sets are first evident examples of upper compact sets because every
net of a compact set has a convergent subnet. The converse is not true in general.
For instance the set of all negative numbers together with 0 is not compact, but
upper compact, the topology and order being usual. As to upper closedness of
variable preference relations, an immediate sufficient condition is that all upper
sections are closed, that is, for every a ∈ X, the upper section {x ∈ X : a ≤u x}
is closed. In fact, let {xi}i∈I be a strictly increasing net converging to x in X.
Let i, j ∈ I with j > i. Then xj ≤u x and xi <u xj . Hence xi <u x for every
i ∈ I. A condition more general then closedness of upper sections is known as
transfer upper continuity and will be given in Application 3. Of course, an upper
closed preference relation may have non-closed upper sections. For instance the
preference relation ” ¹ ” on [0, 2] defined by
x ¹x y if and only if x ≤ y and y 6= 1,
is upper closed, but the upper section at 0 is not closed. The result below is
an useful consequence of Theorem 8. It makes use of upper compactness and
upper closedness, and is quite ready for applications.
Corollary 10 Let X be a topological space. Assume that the variable preference
relation ” ≤x ” is upper closed, weakly consistent and that for some point a ∈ X,
the section S(a) is upper compact. Then S(a) admits a P-complete subsection
and consequently X has ex-ante maximal points.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that S(a) has no P-complete subsections. In
particular there is a strictly increasing net {xi}i∈I in S(a) such that the family
{S(a) \ S(xi) : i ∈ I} is a covering of S(a). In view of upper compactness
hypothesis there is a strictly increasing net in S(a) that dominates {xi}i∈I in
S(a) and admits a convergent subnet {yj}j∈J . It can be seen that the family
{S(a) \S(yj) : j ∈ J} is a covering of S(a) too. Let y be the limit of the subnet
{yj}j∈J . Since S(a) has no P-complete subsection, y cannot be a maximal
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point, hence there is some z ∈ S(a) such that yj ≤u z for all j ∈ J because the
variable preference ” ≤x ” is upper closed. Consequently, S(a) is not covered
by the family {S(a) \ S(yj) : j ∈ J}, a contradiction. The proof is complete.
4 Applications
In this section we show that a number of existing results for maximal elements
from the literature under divers contexts can be derived from the criterion we’ve
developed in the previous section. By our knowledge all of them deal with
constant preference relations and many of them assume that the relation under
consideration is a partial order.
Application 1: Generalization of the Brezis-Browder principle. LetX
be a nonempty set (for us an action set) with a reflexive and transitive preference
relation ” ≤ ”. It is said to be countably inductive (CIO set for short) if every
nondecreasing sequence has an upper bound. Let W be a nonempty set (for us
a payoff or value set) with a partial order ” ¹ ”. It is said to be totally ordered
upper separable if for every totally ordered nonempty set M ⊆ W , there is a
nondecreasing sequence {vn}n≥1 ⊂ M such that every v ∈ M is dominated
by some vn. In term of satisficing, this assumption means that one can always
build a satisficing scale in any totally ordered nonempty payoff (utility) subspace
M ⊂W.
Corollary 11 Assume that X is a CIO set, Y is a totally ordered upper sepa-
rable set and G : X → Y is a nondecreasing map. Then for every x0 ∈ X, there
is some x∗ with x0 ≤ x∗ such that G(x) = G(x∗) for all x with x∗ ≤ x.
The above corollary is the ordering principle by Zhu and Li in a recent
work [31] which generalizes the well-known Brezis-Browder principle as we have
already said.
Application 2: General multicriteria optimization. LetX be a nonempty
set equipped with a partial order ” ≤ ” and let A be a nonempty subset of X.
In multicriteria or vector optimization we are interested in finding maximal el-
ements of A when X is a vector space and in most cases the order is generated
by a convex cone. In a recent work [11] Flores-Bazan et al. have studied this
question in a space without linear structure, generalizing the existing results
in vector optimization. Their main result (Theorem 3.1) states that the set A
has a maximal element if it is order-totally-complete in the sense that it has no
covering of the form X \ S+(x), x ∈ D, where D is a totally ordered subset of
A. It is clear that an order-totally-complete set is P-complete. Hence Theorem
3.1 (see also Theorem 4.3) of Flores-Bazan et al. 2008 [11]) can be derived
from Theorem 8 by a direct application. Note that in [11] (Definition 2.2) the
authors use nonincreasing nets to define order-complete sets, while in [18] and
in Definition 5, we use strictly increasing nets. Working with equivalent classes
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one may prove that a P-complete set is order-totally-complete, and so, applying
Theorem 3.1 of [11] to the transitive closure ” ≤u ” is also an alternative proof
of Theorem 8. Of course, the weak consistency must be then taken into account
to produce a desired result. The proof given in Appendix details the argument
by Zorn’s lemma as exploited in [11] and [19].
Application 3: Transfer upper-continuous preference relation. We
say that a variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is transfer upper-continuous if
x <x y implies the existence of some y′ ∈ X and a neighborhood U(x) in X
such that z <z y′ for all z ∈ U(x). The concept of transfer upper-continuity was
introduced in Tian and Zhou 1995 [25] for a fixed binary relation on X which
generalizes upper continuity of binary relations ( x <x y implies z <z y for all
z in some neighborhood of x). The corollary below is a generalization of the
main results of Bergstrom 1975 [6] and Tian and Zhou 1995 [25].
Corollary 12 Assume that X is a compact set of a topological space and that
the variable preference relation is acyclic and transfer continuous. Then X is
upper compact, and the variable preference relation is upper closed and weakly
consistent. Consequently X has ex-ante maximal points.
It is to note that transfer continuity implies upper closedness. The converse is








: n = 1, 2, ...} ∪ {1; 2}.
A binary relation ” ¹ ” is defined as follows: x ¹ y if and only if x ≤ y (in the
usual sense) and x, y ∈ B. It is evident that the preference relation generated
by that binary relation is upper closed. It is not transfer continuous under the
usual topology of the real numbers because 2 > 1 and in every neighborhood of
1 there are elements of A which are not comparable with 2.
Application 4: Weakly tc-upper semicontinuous preference relation.
We say that the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is weakly tc-upper semicon-
tinuous if it is acyclic and for x <x y there is an open set U(x, y) satisfying
(i) x ∈ U(x, y) and y 6∈ U(x, y);
(ii) F−(z) ⊆ U(x, y) for every z ∈ U(x, y);
(iii) U(x, y) ⊂ U(z, w) and inclusion is strict if x <x y, z <z w and y ∈ U(z, w).
The concept of weak tc-upper semicontinuity was introduced in Zuanon 2009
[32] for binary relations which generalizes transfer continuity. As we shall see
in the proof of the next corollary that this generalization can be reduced to the
case of transfer continuity.
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Corollary 13 Assume that X is a compact set of a topological space and that
the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is weakly tc-upper semicontinuous. Then
X has ex-ante maximal points.
Application 5: Upper continuous preference relation on ” ≺ ”-upper
compact sets. Let Y be a topological space and let ” ¹ ” be a partial order
on Y . We say that Y is ” ¹ ”-upper compact if every covering of Y by a
family of open free disposal sets of Y admits a finite subcovering. Recall that
a set D ⊆ Y is free disposal if x ≺ y, y ∈ D implies x ∈ D. The terminology
”free disposal” is taken from Debreu 1959 [9] in which the usual Pareto partial
order of Rn is considered. Free disposal sets are called lower comprehensive in
Alcantud 2002 [1]. The concept of ” ≺ ”-upper compactness was introduced in
Alcantud 2002 [1] which generalizes compactness.
Corollary 14 Assume that the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is acyclic
such that the sets {y ∈ X : x <u y}, x ∈ X are open and that X is ” <u ”-upper
compact. Then X is P-complete and consequently it has ex-ante maximal points.
The above corollary is essentially Theorem 3 of Alcantud 2002 [1] when the
preference relation is constant.
Application 6: Consistent upper tc-S-semicontinuous preference re-
lation. A (Suzumura) consistent preference relation ” ≤x ” is called upper
tc-S-semicontinuous (in the sense of Andrikopoulos and Zacharias 2009 [3]) if
for every x ∈ X, the set {y ∈ X : y <u x} is open. We derive the following
result of Andrikopoulos and Zacharias 2009 [3] (Theorem 3).
Corollary 15 Assume that the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is consistent
(in Suzumura’s sense) and upper tc-S-semicontinuous and X is ” <u ”-upper
compact. Then X has ex-ante maximal points.
Application 7: Maximum principle. Another generalization of the Brezis-
Browder principle given by Szaz 2007 [24] (see also a less general version by
Altman 1982 [2], Turinici 1984 [28] and Zeidler 1986 [30]) can also be obtained
from Theorem 8. Let X be a nonempty set with a binary relation ” ≤ ”. Let
∆ be a function on X × X with values in the extended real line R. Define a




Here is a generalization of the maximum principle in Szaz 2007 [24].
Corollary 16 Assume that there are a point a ∈ X and a function ∆ : X×X →
R such that
(i) γ is decreasing;
(ii) γ(x) > −∞ for all x ∈ X;
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(iii) γ(a) <∞;
(iv) Every increasing sequence {xn}n≥1 in S(a) with x1 = a is bounded above
and lim infn→∞∆(xn, xn+1) ≤ α;
(v) ∆(x, y) > α for every x < y.
Then X has an ex-ante maximal point in S(a).
5 Related notions
Other concepts of maximality with respect to a variable preference relation is
related to the best action of an agent or a group of agents when he compares
ex-ante, before moving from x∗, the current action x∗ with all others, and the
concept of ex-post maximal points which is a counterpart of ex-ante maximal
points when downward paths are used.
Definition 17 An element x∗ is said to be an ex-ante ideal point if y ≤x∗ x∗
for every y ∈ X.
It is clear that an ideal point is maximal, but the converse is not true in
general. For instance the segment joining the points (1, 0) and (0, 1) in R2 has
no ideal points, but every point of it is maximal, the preference relation being
the usual Pareto order in R2. An ideal point, if it exists, is not necessarily
unique, except for the case when the preference relation is antisymmetric. It is
easy to check that x∗ ∈ X is ex-ante ideal if and only if
S−(x∗) = X,
or equivalently
x∗ ∈ ∩y∈XF+(y). (5)
We shall make use of the last condition to find sufficient conditions of existence
of ex-ante ideal points. To this end let us recall the following result of [20]: If
a family {Ai : i ∈ I} of subsets of a compact space is intersectionally closed
and has the finite intersection property, then the intersection of its members
is nonempty. The family {Ai : i ∈ I} of nonempty subsets in a topological
space is intersectionally closed if cl(∩i∈IAi) = ∩i∈I cl(Ai); and it has the finite
intersection property if the intersection of any finite number of elements of the
family is nonempty. Several sufficient conditions for intersectional closedness
are found in Luc et al. 2010 [20].
Theorem 18 Assume that X is compact and the following conditions hold:
(i) For a finite set D ⊆ X, there is a point xD ∈ X such that y ≤xD xD for
every y ∈ D;
(ii) The family {F+(x) : x ∈ X} is intersectionally closed.
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Then X has ex-ante ideal points.
Proof. In view of (i), the family {F+(x) : x ∈ X} has the finite intersection
property, and by (ii) it is intersectionally closed. According to the finite in-
tersection principle, there is some x∗ ∈ F+(x) for all x ∈ X. By (5) x∗ is an
ex-ante ideal point of X.
As a consequence of the above theorem we deduce an existence condition
for quasi-convex preference relations. Assume that X is a convex subset of a
vector space. The variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is quasi-convex if x ≤y y
and x ≤z z imply x ≤u u for every u = ty + (1− t)z, t ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 19 Assume that X is a nonempty convex and compact subset of a
Banach space, and that the following conditions hold:
(i) For every x ∈ X the set F+(x) is convex and closed;
(ii) The variable preference relation is quasi-convex.
Then X has ex-ante ideal points.
Proof. Since the set F+(x), x ∈ X are closed, Condition (ii) of Theorem 18 is
satisfied. Moreover, (ii) implies that the family {F+(x) : x ∈ X} has the finite
intersection property. It remains to apply Theorem 18 to complete the proof.
Ex-post maximal points. In this last part we consider a move from x to
y, not from the ”ex-ante” point of view, before moving from the origin x, but,
”ex-post”, after moving, from the point of view of the arrival point y. As before,
” ≤x ” is a reflexive variable preference relation on X.
Definition 20 An element x∗ is said to be ex-post maximal if there is no other
element y ∈ X such that x∗ <y y ; and it is said to be ex-post ideal if y ≤y x∗
for all y ∈ X.
Then, an element x∗ is ex-post maximal if there is no point y such that, once
arrived at y, from the point of view of y, starting from x∗, an agent or a group
of agents strictly prefer to stay at y than to come back to x∗. An element x∗
is ex-post ideal if once moved to any y, and based on the judgement at y, an
agent or a group of agents regret that move. We can see also that x∗ is ex-post
maximal if and only if
F>(x∗) = ∅; (6)
and it is ex-post ideal if and only if
F−(x∗) = X, (7)
or equivalently
x∗ ∈ ∩x∈XS+(x). (8)
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Notice also that when the variable preference relation ” ≤x ” is constant in
the sense that for every x, y ∈ X the preference relations ” ≤x ” and ” ≤y ”
coincide, there is no distinction between ex-ante and ex-post maximalities. It is
important to note that existence conditions for ex-post maximal points follow
the same pattern of ex-ante maximal points. Therefore we do not further go
into details of these conditions. Let us give just one counterpart of Theorem 18
as an example.
Theorem 21 Assume that X is a nonempty compact set and that the following
conditions hold.
(i) For a finite set D ⊆ X, there is a point xD ∈ X such that x ≤x xD for
every x ∈ D;
(ii) The family {S+(x) : x ∈ X} is intersectionally closed.
Then X has ex-post ideal points.
Proof. Apply the argument of Theorem 18 and the relation (8).
We close up this section by observing that under (ii) of Theorem 21 Con-
dition (i) is equivalent to the existence of ex-post ideal points. Moreover, the
compactness of X can be relaxed by compactness of an upper section S+(x0)
for some x0 ∈ X. This is because when the family of S+(x) is intersectionally
closed, then the family of S+(x) ∩ S+(x0) is also intersectionally closed. It is
clear that the above observation is valid for ex-ante ideal points as well.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 8. The ”only if ” part is evident, by taking a among
maximal points. To prove the ”if” part we first consider the case where the
upper transitive closure ” ≤u ” is a partial order on X. As we have seen in
Proposition 4 this is the case when the variable preference is acyclic. We wish
to prove that the set X has ex-ante maximal points. Suppose to the contrary
that it is not the case. Then the set P of all strictly increasing nets in S(a) is
nonempty. Introduce a partial order on P by inclusion, i.e. for a, b ∈ P one
writes a ¹ b if and only if a ⊆ b as sets. It is easy to see that this order is
a partial order on P and one may apply Zorn’s lemma to obtain a maximal
element of P. We give here a detailed proof of application of Zorn’s lemma.
First we prove that P satisfies the hypothesis of Zorn’s lemma : every chain
D = {aλ : λ ∈ Λ} ⊆ P has an upper bound. Indeed, denote by B the family
of all finite subsets of Λ. For each B ∈ B we set aB :=
⋃
λ∈B aλ . It is evident
that aB ∈ P. Now we put a0 = ∪{aB : B ∈ B}. We show that a0 is a strictly
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increasing net, which means that it belongs to P. Indeed, let x and y be two
distinct elements of a0. There are two indices λ and λ′ from Λ such that x is
an element of aλ and y is an element of aλ′ . Since D is a chain, we may assume
that aλ is included in aλ′ . Thus, both x and y are elements of the strictly
increasing net aλ′ , and so either x <u y or y <u x. This proves that a0 is
strictly increasing. Moreover, it is evident that a ¹ a0 for all a ∈ D. Hence a0
is an upper bound of X. According to Zorn’s lemma there is a maximal element
a∗, say a∗ = {xi}i∈I ∈ P. We claim that the family {x ∈ S(a) : xi 6≤u x}i∈I is
a covering of S(a). Indeed, since a∗ is maximal, there is no x ∈ S(a) such that
xi ≤u x for all i ∈ I. In other words, for every x ∈ S(a) there is some i ∈ I
such that xi 6≤u x. Thus, the above mention family of sets is a covering of S(a)
and we arrive at a contradiction with the P-completeness hypothesis. By this
X has an ex-ante maximal point. We now proceed to the case where the upper
transitive closure ” ≤u ” is not a partial order. Consider the induced preference
” ¹u ” on equivalent classes of X. It is a partial order on [X]. Denote by Sˆ(a)
the section of [X] at [a] with respect to the induced order:
Sˆ(a) = {[x] ∈ [X] : [a] ¹u [x]}.
It can be seen that [x] ∈ Sˆ(a) if and only if x ∈ S(a). We show that Sˆ(a) is
P-complete with respect to the induced preference. Indeed, let {[xα]}α∈I be
a strictly increasing net with respect to the induced preference in Sˆ(a). Then
{xα}α∈I is a strictly increasing net with respect to ” ≤u ” in S(a). If Sˆ(a) were
covered by the family {[X]\ Sˆ(xα) : α ∈ I}, then for every x ∈ S(a) there would
exist some i ∈ I such that [x] ∈ [X] \ Sˆ(xi). Then [x] 6∈ Sˆ(xi), which implies
[xi] 6¹u [x], and so xi 6≤u x. We deduce that x ∈ X \ S(xi), which contradicts
the P-completeness of S(a). Now we apply the first part of the proof to the
induced preference to obtain a ¹u-maximal element [x∗] of [X]. Since the vari-
able preference is weakly consistent, in view of Proposition 6, x∗ is an ex-ante
maximal element of X as well. The proof is complete.
Proof of Corollary 11. By working on equivalent classes if necessary one
may assume without loss of generality that X is partially ordered. Now define
a new preference relation ”¢ ” by x¢ x′ if and only if either x = x′, or x < x′
and G(x) < G(x′). It is clear that this relation is a partial order. Consider a
section S(x0) of X at x0 (with respect to the new relation). We show that it
is P-complete. Indeed, let {xi}i∈I be a strictly increasing net in S(x0), then
{G(xi)}i∈I is an increasing net, hence, by choosing a totally ordered subnet if
necessary, we may assume it is a totally ordered set in Y . By hypothesis there
is a sequence {xn}n≥1 from the above net such that for each i ∈ I there is some
n(i) with G(xi) ≤ G(xn(i)). We may assume {G(xn)}n≥0 is increasing, which
implies that {xn}n≥0 is strictly increasing with respect to ” ≤ ”. By the CIO
assumption, there is an upper bound of {xn}n≥0 which is also an upper bound
for the net {xi}i∈I . Then that upper bound belongs to S(xi) for all i ∈ I and
the family {X \ S(xi) : i ∈ I} does not cover S(x0). Thus S(x0) is P-complete.
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According to Theorem 8 there is a maximal point x in S(x0) for the relation
”¢ ” which is a point we look for.
Proof of Corollary 12. Since the preference relation is acyclic, it is weakly
consistent. The upper compactness of X follows from its compactness as we
have already mentioned. It remains to prove the upper closedness of the vari-
able preference relation. Let {xα}α∈I be a convergent strictly increasing net in
X. Let x be its limit. If S>(x) is empty, we are done. If S>(x) is nonempty,
say x <x y for some y ∈ X, then by transfer continuity, there is some y′ ∈ X
and a neighborhood U such that z <z y′, z ∈ U. In particular, there is α0 ∈ I
such that xα <xα y
′ for all α > α0. This implies that xα <u y′ for all α ∈ I
(choose β ∈ I with α < β and α0 < β, then xα <u xβ and xβ <xβ y′ implying
xα <
u y′). Thus, all the assumptions of Corollary 10 hold and so X has maxi-
mal points.
Proof of Corollary 13. Let {Uλ : λ ∈ Λ} denote the family of all open sets in
the definition of weak tc-upper semicontinuity. Define a new preference relation
on X by x ≺ y if there is some Uλ such that x ∈ Uλ and y 6∈ Uλ. It is easy to
see that this new preference added by the diagonal of the product space X ×X
is a partial order on X which is upper continuous, hence transfer continuous.
In view of Corollary 12 the set X has a maximal element with respect to that
new order. It is clear that that maximal element is also maximal with respect
to the given variable preference relation on X.
Proof of Corollary 14. Since the preference is acyclic, it is weakly consis-
tent as well. We prove that X is P-complete. Indeed, let {xα}α∈I be a strictly
increasing net in X. Consider the family Aα := X \ cl(S(xα)), α ∈ I, where
cl(.) stands for the closure. It is clear that every member of this family is open
and free disposal. If the family {X \ S(xα) : α ∈ I} were a covering of X,
then so would the family {Aα : α ∈ I} be, and by hypothesis, it would ad-
mit a finite covering, say Aαi , i = 1, ..., n. Take any β > αi, i = 1, ..., n. Then
xαi <
u xβ , i = 1, ..., n. This implies that xβ 6∈ Aαi for all i = 1, ..., n and we
arrive at a contradiction. It remains to apply Theorem 8 to complete the proof.
Proof of Corollary 15. Denote by [X] the space of equivalent classes of el-
ements of X with respect to the preference ” ≤x ”; and equip [X] with the
quotient topology and the quotient preference. It is known that when the pref-
erence is consistent, the quotient preference is a partial order. Moreover, with
respect to the quotient topology, the quotient preference is continuous and [X]
is upper compact. Applying Corollary 13 to the space [X] we obtain a maximal
class, say [x]. Then any element of this class is an ex-ante maximal point of X
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with respect to the given variable preference (see Proposition 6).
Proof of Corollary 16. Consider the section S(a). It follows from (i)-(iii)
that γ(x) is finite for every x ∈ S(a). It is also clear from (i) that the transitive
closure of the binary relation ” ≤ ” is path consistent. Thus, by working on
equivalent classes if necessary one may assume without loss of generality that
the transitive closure ” ≤u ” is a partial order on S(a). We show that the section
S(a) is P-complete. Indeed, let {xi}i∈I be a strictly increasing net in S(a), then
one may choose an increasing (with respect to the transitive closure) sequence
{xi(n)}n≥1 from that net such that
lim
n→∞ γ(xi(n)) = limi
γ(xi).
Here the limit may take the value −∞. Then for every i ∈ I, there is some
i(n) such that xi ≤ xi(n). Indeed, given i ∈ I, by the choice of the sequence
{xi(n)}n≥1 there is i(n) such that γ(xi(n) ≤ γ(xi). The decreasingness of γ im-
plies that xi ≤ xi(n) as requested. Then we deduce that if S(a) is covered
by the family {x ∈ S(a) : xi 6≤u x}, i ∈ I, then it is covered by the family
{x ∈ S(a) : xi(n) 6≤u x}, n = 1, 2, .. too. Notice that the sequence {xi(n)}n≥1
is increasing with respect to the binary relation ” ≤ ”. In view of (iv), it has
an upper bound, say b ∈ S(a) such that xi(n) ≤ b for every n ≥ 1. But then b
does not belong to {x ∈ S(a) : xi(n) 6≤u x}, n = 1, 2, ... Consequently S(a) is
P-complete and by Theorem 8, the set S(a) has a maximal point which is also
a maximal point of X.
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